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Abstract 
Istanbul Strait is one of the most important and dangerous maritime passage in the 
world. In this study, the hazards for possible accidents of the tankers carrying 
various chemicals through the Istanbul Strait were investigated and a significant 
risk was identified due to the intensive transportation of the chemicals. The 
purpose of this work is to define some risk control options in order to establish an 
efficient management system which can minimize the probability of accidents and 
hazardous effects of possible chemical spills to human life and environment. The 
risk is assessed by using the Formal Safety Assessment Methodology of the 
International Maritime Organization. Following this methodology hazards of 
accidents were identified through a questionnaire which is applied to a group of 
experts focussed on a passage of Istanbul Strait. In addition to this, a frequency 
analysis of the accidents was carried out on the defined sections along the strait 
using the accident database in order to determine the geographical distribution of 
the type and cause of the accidents. On the other hand, the maritime traffic of the 
Istanbul Strait was simulated using computer based software in order to investigate 
the effects of the local traffic on the passage. As a conclusion of the simulation the 
hot spots were defined as the potential locations for collisions. Also the 
consequences of such probable accidents were evaluated by using different 
dispersion modelling software for the spilled chemicals. As a result, a 
comprehensive management system for preparedness and response to chemical 
spills in the Istanbul Strait were proposed by taking into account the current 
management system and response equipment. Furthermore, a detailed economic 
analysis of the proposed system was also performed. 
Keywords: Istanbul Strait, maritime accident, tanker, risk assessment, collision, 
chemical spill, oil spill, emergency, response, preparedness, simulation  
1 Introduction 
The safety at sea is based on a set of accepted rules that are, in general, agreed 
upon through the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO is a 
specialized agency of the United Nations which is responsible for developing 
measures to improve the safety and security of international shipping and to 
prevent marine pollution from ships. The IMO¶V main concern is to develop 
international treaties and other legislation concerning safety and marine pollution 
prevention. Much of maritime safety policy worldwide has been developed after 
serious accidents such as; Exxon Valdez, Erika, and Prestige. This approach was 
discontinued following the introduction of the Formal Safety Assessment 
Guideline (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12) in 1997. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) was 
introduced by the IMO as a rational and systematic process for assessing the risk 
related to maritime safety, the protection of the marine environment and for 
evaluating the costs and benefitVRI,02¶VRSWLRQVIRUUHGXFLQJthese risks. FSA 
should also SURYLGHVXSSRUWWRWKH,02¶VGHFLVLRQ-making process. Kontovas et 
al [1]. In this study the transportation of dangerous chemicals (including crude oil) 
via tankers through the Istanbul Strait was investigated by using the FSA 
Methodology. The Strait of Istanbul, in particular, presents the greatest challenge 
for navigation as it flows through the heart of Istanbul, a city of over 15 million 
people and rich ZLWKWKRXVDQGVRI\HDUVRIKLVWRU\ZKLFKLVGHFODUHGDVDµµ:RUOG
+HULWDJH &LW\¶¶ E\ UNESCO. The Strait of Istanbul, the narrow waterway 
separating Europe from Asia, holds a strategic importance in maritime 
transportation. ,WLVFRQVLGHUHGDVRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VPRVWFRQJHVWHGDQGGLIILFXOW-
to-navigate waterways. Approximately 9000 tankers pass through the Istanbul 
Strait by carrying 130 million tonnes dangerous cargo annually [2]. The 
narrowness, bends, currents and densely populated shores make navigation quite 
dangerous in this waterway. 
 
The Strait of Istanbul is approximately 17 Nautical Miles (NM) long; the average 
time for completing one passage is 1.7 hours. It takes several sharp turns, forcing 
the ships to alter course at least 12 times, sometimes executing turns of up to 80 
degrees. There are roughly 128 ships passes through the strait on a daily average 
Oral et. al. [3]. Additionally, on the vertical direction to this traffic there is also an 
intensive domestic ferry traffic between two sides of the Istanbul Strait mostly for 
passengers and cars. There are more than 1500 domestic daily ships passages 
taking place between the two sides of the strait [2]. There have been a number of 
catastrophic accidents in the Istanbul Strait in the past. The Independenta (1979) 
and the Nassia (1994) tanker accidents deeply affected the citizens of Istanbul and 
the environment by causing the death of 72 people and 115 000 tonnes of chemical 
spill to the marine environment. After these major spills, significant measures 
were taken in order to ensure the safe passage through the Istanbul Strait. 
Accordingly, Turkish Straits Regulation was established on 1998 which defined 
the passage rules. Similarly, the Vessel Traffic Information System was 
established in 2003 which controls the traffic by remote sensing radars. 
Furthermore, one way traffic regime was introduced on 2006 aiming to decrease 
the probability of collisions. However, accidents still occur in the Istanbul Strait. 
It was recorded that there were 228 shipping accidents in Istanbul Strait between 
2006 and 2012 [4]. Therefore, this study is aiming to suggest a management 
system for Istanbul Strait which covers the mitigating measures to increase the 
following; 
x the capability of preparedness 
x the capacity for emergency response operations to the chemical spills  
x the cleaning and rehabilitation measures after the spill.  
This management system could be a key factor to decrease the risk of a possible 
chemical spill from a tanker carrying dangerous chemicals. 
2 Methodology 
Ensuring navigational safety in Istanbul Strait and the protecting its coastal 
population and environment from ship sourced hazards are of great importance. It 
should be noted that, the amount of chemicals transported through Istanbul Strait 
is approximately 130 million tonnes per year [3] is far more than the annual 
capacity of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipe line which is around 60 million tonnes or 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline which is around 83 million tonnes. On this occasion, a 
management system is recommended within this study which includes risk control 
options (RCO) for tanker accidents that may result in chemical spills. These 
recommended RCOs constitute an accident management system, which is defined 
specifically for the Istanbul Strait. This study starts with analysis of the accident 
probability and possible locations for a tanker accident through the Istanbul Strait. 
First, in order to analyse the passage and incident densities with respect to location, 
16 parallel sections, which are 1 nautical mile apart from each other were created 
from north to south along the strait. 1st and the 16th sections are designed bigger 
when compared to others in order to capture the ship movements from different 
angels into the strait area. The environmental parameters like currents, sharp turns, 
shallow and narrow areas were analysed in each section in order to define the most 
difficult sections to navigate. On this context, a questionnaire was developed and 
implemented in order to capture expert opinions about the most dangerous sections 
of the Istanbul Strait. For that reason, experts were selected from maritime domain 
who are actively using the Istanbul Strait to navigate. Following the questionnaire 
a simulation modelling of the passage was created on PROMODEL software 
programme. The aim of this simulation was to define the probability of collision 
between the tankers and the domestic ferries. The traffic was simulated replicating 
the real traffic density of Istanbul Strait considering both the number of ships and 
the time of heavy traffic. Simulation modelling is an important tool which was 
used for risk assessment and collision probability modelling, Goerlandt et al [5]. 
After running the simulations for a five year duration the collision probability of 
the tankers and the domestic ferries within each section was calculated. Also past 
accident statistics were investigated between 2006 and 2012 in order to define in 
which sections the accidents occurred more. These studies created a clear idea 
about the probability and possible location of a tanker accident along Istanbul 
Strait. After accident probability investigation, this study continues with the 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), which starts with the identification of hazards. 
Potential hazards involved in the passage of the Istanbul Strait were defined with 
a brainstorming session by using the accident statistics and an expert 
questionnaire. The main hazards during the passage were defined as; contact, 
collision, grounding, fire, explosion and structural failure. The main aim of first 
step was to define what can go wrong during the passage. The second step of FSA 
was a quantitative risk assessment, which aimed to find how likely these hazards 
occur as well as how severe the consequences could be. The risk is identified as 
the multiplication of the frequency and the consequence (severity). The tanker 
accident statistics between 1991 and 2008 are used for the calculations. The event 
tree methodology was used to create scenarios and calculate the risk summation 
by defining the frequency and consequence for each scenario. Also in order to 
better understand the severity of chemical spills, dispersion modelling of the most 
transported chemicals was done by utilising GNOME and ALOHA software 
programmes. The aim of dispersion modelling was to understand the physical 
movement of the chemicals in atmosphere and water. By this way, an estimation 
was done on the number of people, who could be effected from a chemical spill in 
Istanbul. In the last step, potential areas of improvement were identified and 
necessary 5&2¶V were defined in order to create an accident management system 
for Istanbul Strait. Furthermore, the financial effect of this management system 
was evaluated in order to put forward the feasibility of implementation. 
3 Accident probability 
There are several analyses made in this study in order to assess the accident 
probability through Istanbul Strait. Figure 1 shows the created sections along the 
Istanbul Strait and the steps for assessing the accident probability.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Defined sections on the Istanbul Strait 
 
First of all, the accident ratio analysis was made and the distribution of the 
accidents along Istanbul Strait was defined. The second study was the simulation 
of the traffic and the collision probability was defined. Third study was an expert 
questionnaire which defines the navigational hazards.  
 
3.1 Accident ratio 
The accidents statistics between 2006 and 2012 in Istanbul strait were investigated 
and the accident ratio was calculated for each section by dividing the number of 
accidents to the ships passed on that section annually. The average accident ratios 
presented in diagram 1 showed that the 1st section has the highest accident ratio 
while other sections also have significant accident ratios. Although similar number 
of accident happened in the 1st and 16th sections the 1st section has the highest 
accident ratio because of the less number of ship passes observed in the 1st section. 
It should be known that there are more than 1500 domestic ships passages take 
place daily across the strait. This domestic traffic is flowing mostly between 9th 
and 16th sections which decreased the accident ratio numbers on these sections. 
On the other hand the 9th and the 10th sections are well known areas where the 
currents and sharp turns significantly affect the safety of navigation adversely. 
Also the 13th VHFWLRQ WKHUH LVDQ LQWHQVHGRPHVWLF WUDIILFH[LVWVRQ%HúLNWDúDQG
Üsküdar wharfs. (Sections 13) 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: Accident Ratio 
3.2 Simulation of the passage 
The traffic of the Istanbul Strait was modelled by using the PROMODEL 
simulation software. The average speed for the ships navigating along the strait 
was defined as 10 Knots which is the current speed limit within Turkish Straits 
Regulation 1997. 128 ships were navigating along the strait daily and 25 of them 
were tankers. Only one direction passage was simulated and direction changed 
every 12 hours which is in line with the current implementation. On the other hand, 
from 14 wharfs 1529 domestic ferries were navigated by using the standard time 
tariffs with an average 8 knot speed. 16 junctions were defined where the ships 
and the domestic ferries cross their navigational route. During the simulation if a 
ship and a domestic ferry enters the junction at the same time then, this situation 
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is counted as a crossing each other. These crossings are potentially dangerous 
activities because in these situations the safety of the navigation will heavily rely 
on the performance of the officer of the watch (human element) who is in charge 
of steering the vessel. The simulation was run for a 5 year duration and the 
simulations are repeated 6 times. The results showed that the 13th and 14th sections 
are the locations where most of the crossing between tankers and domestic ferries 
took place during the simulations. These sections are the locations where the 
busiest wharfs such as %HúLNWDú hVNGDU .DUDN|\ (PLQ|Q DQG +DUHP
(Sections 13 and 14) for domestic ferry traffic are located. There are also no 
junctions on the sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 15 and 16 as the domestic ferries do not cross 
between the two sides of the strait and their route is parallel to the tankers 
navigating along the Istanbul Strait on these sections. 
 
 
 
Diagram 2: Simulation results 
 
3.3 Expert questionnaire 
The expert questionnaire was applied to 13 participants, who were selected from 
maritime domain and actively have a role on pilotage or administration or using 
the strait to navigate. The questions asked them were about the environmental 
parameters like effect of currents, sharp turns, shallow and narrow areas for each 
section in order to define the most difficult sections to navigate. In addition, the 
effect of the domestic traffic and the probability of collision with domestic ferries 
were also asked. The experts evaluated the hazards by giving points between 1 and 
10 for each parameter along each section while 1 is for smallest option and 10 is 
the biggest option to value the danger. The average values of the answers were 
reported in diagram 3. The results showed that the sections numbered 8, 10 and 11 
were defined as most dangerous sections by the experts.  Furthermore, the accident 
ratio calculation results and the expert opinions were compared together also in 
diagram 3. The experts generally defined the dangers on the same sections where 
the accident ratio is also high. Only in three areas the opinions of the experts does 
not similar with the accident ratios. These are the North entrance of the Istanbul 
Strait (sections 1 and 2) where the accident ratio is high, WKHøVWLQ\HVHFWLRQ,9) 
and the Kandilli, Çengelköy (sections 10, 11, 12) where the accident ratio is low. 
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The sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 are very narrow areas where it is difficult to navigate 
especially for big ships. Therefore, seafarers pay extra attention in these areas 
while navigating because of the well-known environmental and navigational 
challenges. These challenges motivate the sailors to take extra precautions and 
become more careful. This attitude can be evaluated as the reason of low accident 
ratios in dangerous areas. On the other hand, expert opinions for areas 1 and 2 
contradict with the accident statistics as the accident ratio appears to be 
significantly higher compared to WKHH[SHUWV¶MXGJHPHQW. This can be attributed to 
the fact that seafarer navigating from open seas into the narrow passage may be 
failing to improve their situational awareness and alertness.  Furthermore, due to 
the one way traffic system, number of stationary ships in section 1 may create 
additional navigational challenges. This requires further investigation. 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: Questionnaire results 
 
4 Risk assessment 
Risk was analysed by using the Formal Safety Assessment methodology of 
International Maritime Organization. The data of tanker accidents in the world 
between 1991 and 2008 were used for this analysis. In order to create a relation 
between the tanker accident data in the world and the Istanbul Strait, the tanker 
accidents happened in narrow areas with intense traffic were used. Tankers in this 
section are investigated in two separate groups; chemical tankers and oil tankers. 
This segregation is done because the number of the oil tankers and the amount of 
the oil transported are much more than those in chemical tankers. Through this 
segregation it is aimed to investigate unique differences between the two 
aforementioned categories in detail. The event tree methodology was used to 
create scenarios and calculate the risk summation. The frequencies for each 
scenario were calculated using the ship accident data. When calculating the 
severities for each scenario, the data on loss of life in tanker accidents and the data 
about the amount of spills were used. In order to calculate the economic loss, 
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several assumptions were made: a 40 000 DWT tanker was used as a basis; price 
of the tanker was assumed as 60 million USD including cargo and bunker on 
board. The severity of accidents were analysed under three groups as small, 
medium and big  accidents where the material damage assumed as 5%, 30% and 
RI WKHVKLS¶VSULFH accordingly.  Moreover, salvage, repair and operating 
costs were included. The economic loss is calculated in every scenario by using 
the aforementioned assumptions. In the event tree methodology the risk is 
calculated mathematically as shown in the equation (1) by multiplying the 
probability (Pi) and the consequence (Ci) for each scenario. The total risk can be 
calculated with the summation of risks in all scenarios.  
 
Risk = C1.P1 + C2.P2 «&N.PN =σ ܥ݅Ǥ ܲ݅௡௜ୀଵ   (1) 
 
Table 1: Results of the risk assessment for chemical tankers 
 
Chemical Tankers 
Accident Type 
Frequency 
(accidents/
ship.year) 
Potential loss 
of lives (PLL) 
(Fatalities/ship.
year) 
Potential loss of 
Cargo(PLC) 
(tonnes/ship.year) 
Potential 
Economic loss 
(PEL) 
($/ship.year) 
Contact 4,66E-03 1,35E-04 4,30E-02 7,19E+02 
Collision 3,05E-03 8,32E-05 3,28E-02 7,10E+02 
Grounding 3,75E-03 3,18E-05 8,26E-02 8,21E+02 
Fire 2,31E-04 5,32E-05 9,83E-06 1,80E+02 
Explosion 8,77E-04 1,15E-04 1,09E-02 2,21E+02 
Structural Failure 3,24E-03 2,43E-05 1,98E-03 1,86E+03 
 
Table 2: Results of the risk assessment for oil tankers 
 
Oil Tankers 
Accident Type 
Frequency 
(ship.year
) 
Potential loss of 
lives (PLL) 
(Fatalities/ship.
year) 
Potential loss of 
Cargo(PLC) 
(tonnes/ship.year) 
Potential 
Economical loss 
(PEL) 
($/ship.year) 
Contact 3,84E-04 1,91E-05 2,86E-02 1,35E+02 
Collision 3,74E-04 2,17E-05 1,68E-03 1,14E+02 
Grounding 4,60E-04 1,02E-05 5,35E-04 1,47E+02 
Fire 8,70E-05 1,44E-05 6,44E-04 5,40E+01 
Explosion 4,51E-05 4,87E-06 1,09E-02 6,97E+01 
Structural Failure 4,55E-04 7,28E-06 1,00E-03 3,06E+02 
The table 1 and 2 summarizes the results of the risk analysis with respect to the 
tanker and accident types. The estimated frequencies for the accidents and the 
estimated risks for loss of life, loss of cargo and economical loses were calculated. 
In general, the potential life, cargo and economic losses for chemical tankers are 
estimated to be higher than the oil tankers. This is due to the higher accident 
frequencies of chemical tankers compared to the oil tankers. The difference in 
accident frequencies are also reflected on the economic loss values as the same 
economic assumptions were made for each tanker type.   
 
5 Modelling of spilled chemicals 
 
The behaviour of a substance spills at sea is altered during the first few hours. 
Predicting this behaviour is one of the most important stages in the development 
of a response strategy. In this study, the chemicals including crude oil from 
Istanbul Strait was classified due to their physical and chemical properties and also 
ranked due to the transportation amounts and frequencies of the transportation. 
The gases and evaporators were studied by using ALOHA software. The floaters 
were studied by GNOME software. These two software, which are practical and 
reliable tools, are the product of NOAA-National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration of USA [8] and open for public use GNOME is proved to be 
valuable, efficient and low cost tools for oil spill modelling strategies. Almeida et 
al [6]. This study was designed to focus on several spill scenarios along the 
Istanbul Strait and aimed to investigate the dispersion behaviour of the chemicals. 
It was also tried to make estimation on the number of people who could be affected 
from the chemicals in each scenario. The results showed for the floater chemicals 
which were modelled by GNOME that all the spills floats through the strait from 
north to south direction and reach to the Marmara Sea and disperse into the 
Marmara Sea. The more viscous ones disperse in smaller areas but less viscous 
ones disperse in larger areas as far as ø]PLW%D\ (23 nautical miles away from the 
southern exit of the Istanbul Strait-Figure 2-b).  
 
             
(a)                                                   (b) 
Figure 2: ALOHA (a) and GNOME (b) software outputs.  
The results showed that the accident management in the Istanbul Strait should be 
organized by taking into account the dispersed chemicals into the Marmara Sea. 
The gases and evaporator chemicals were modelled by ALOHA software and the 
gas clouds produced by the software were imported into a digital map for several 
scenarios in order to analyse the extent of dispersion. The results in Figure 2-a 
ø]PLW%D\ 
Marmara 
showed that the gas clouds will move significant distances on shore areas and can 
disperse between 7 and 18 km2. An estimation was made by using the density of 
population in Istanbul and it is calculated that between 4 000 and 40 000 people 
can be affected with respect to the scenarios created.  
6 Management of accidents 
Management of a chemical spill accident in Istanbul Strait should be evaluated 
under the disaster management coverage due to the fact that the management 
system should include preparedness activities, which covers civil protection 
measures. A complete set of measures were proposed within this study specifically 
for Istanbul Strait which is aimed to decrease the severity of the accidents resulted 
in chemical spills. First proposed measure is to create an expert team consist of 20 
people which will work 24 hours standby basis at an emergency response centre 
located at the Istanbul Strait. Second proposed measure is to locate emergency 
response equipment containers on 13 wharfs along to Istanbul Strait. with the 
equipment like as response vessels, protective clothes, barriers, skimmers, 
absorbents etc. are defined by using the standards  in the current Legislation of 
Turkey and stockpiles in the world such as Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL), 
Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), and East Asia Response Ltd 
(EARL).  
 
Table 3: Financial Assessment 
 
    Cost TL Cost USD TOTAL USD 
Fixed 
Investment 
  
  
Equipment 6 321 550 3 327 131 
  
3 461 342 
  
Software 180 000 94 736 
Consultancy for 
plans and etc. 75 000 39 473 
  
  
Cost 
TL/Year 
Cost 
USD/Year 
TOTAL 
USD/Year  
Operational 
Cost 
  
  
  
  
  
Personnel cost 696 000 366 315 
  
928 765 
  
  
  
  
  
Maintenance of eqp. 101 000 53 157 
Operation of centre 160 000 84 210 
Drills 25 000 13 157 
Raising awareness 
tools 125 000 237 500 
Depreciation of fixed 
investment 657 655 1 249 544 
 
Third measure is to prepare an emergency response plan dedicated for Istanbul 
Strait, which is supported by modelling, communication and notification software. 
Fourth measure is to prepare awareness raising/training tools and a civil protection 
system in order to decrease the severity of spilled chemicals. It is believed that 
these measures will create an efficient accident management system in Istanbul 
Strait. Table 3 shows the proposed measures and estimation of the costs of these 
measures. The cost of chemical spill cannot be determined easily. The cost of the 
cleaning activities can be a small portion when we take into account the indirect 
costs to the economy and environment. After Exon Valdes oil spill on 1989 in 
Alaska the court awarded $287 million for actual damages and $5 billion for 
punitive damages, Skinner et al [7]. As a result when the cost of the proposed system 
is compared with an actual spill, the results show that the proposed management 
system is feasible. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This study proposes reorganization in the region in order to establish a new 
accident management system which will focus on increasing the capabilities on 
preparedness activities to the accidents, increase the capabilities for effective and 
rapid response to chemical spills. In order to evaluate the accident probability and 
hot spots for accidents several analyses were conducted within this study 
investigating issue from different perspectives. These analyses demonstrated the 
environmental hazards for safety of navigation and the perception of the users on 
the threats for the strait. Moreover, the accident ratio study showed where the 
accidents are concentrated. Also, the simulation study showed the interaction of 
the tankers with domestic ferries that create potentially dangerous situations. The 
ULVNDVVHVVPHQWE\XVLQJWKH,02¶V)6$PHWKRGRORJ\HQDEOHVTXDQWLILFDWLRQRI
the risks for tankers passing through the Istanbul strait. Furthermore, in order to 
demonstrate the severity of an incident which involves a chemical spill, a basic 
dispersion modelling was used and the number of people and areas likely to be 
affected were estimated. This modelling study showed that a potential chemical 
spill can cause a disaster because of the estimated number of effected people. It 
was considered as important to demonstrate the amount of financial need to 
establish the proposed management system. The proposed system can be 
categorised as an enhancement of the current system which should not be 
evaluated as a new system. This feature is the key element to decrease the need 
for budget and make it practical to start implementations in a short time period. 
Estimated costs of establishing the proposed system can be considered as feasible 
for such an important region. However it also needs to be noted that success of 
such accident management systems heavily rely up on the strong administrative 
support due to the fact that a significant legislative revision will be required. This 
study is a step towards evaluating the hazards of tanker accidents and chemical 
spills for Istanbul Strait and proposes an enhancement on the current system which 
can be implemented easily and in a cost effective manner. 
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